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Abstract 
 
Message Sequence Charts (MSCs) are 
an appealing visual formalism mainly used 
in the early stages of system design to 
capture the system requirements. However, if 
we move towards an implementation, an 
executable specifications related in some 
fashion to the MSC-based requirements must 
be obtained. The MSCs can be used 
effectively to specify the bus protocol in the 
way where high-level transition systems is 
used to capture the control flow of the system 
components of the protocol and MSCs to 
describe the non-atomic component 
interactions. This system of specification is 
amenable to formal verification. In this 
paper, we present the way how we can 
specify the bus protocols using MSCs and 
how these specifications can be translated 
into program of verification tool (we have 
used Symbolic Model Verifier (SMV)) for the 
use of formal verification. We have 
contributed to the following tasks in this 
respect. Firstly, the way to specify the 
protocol using MSC has been presented. 
Secondly, a translator that translates the 
specifications (described in a textual input 
file) into SMV programs has been 
constructed. Finally, we have presented the 
verification result of the AMBA bus protocol 
using the SMV program found through the 
translation process. The SMV program found 
through the translation process can be used 
in order to automatically verify various 
properties of any bus protocol specified.  
Keywords: Message Sequence Charts 
(MSCs), Symbolic Model Verifier (SMV), 
Formal Verification, Bus Protocol, Syntax 
Analysis, Syntactic Analysis. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Message Sequence Charts (MSCs) are 
an attractive visual formalism used in the 
early design stages of systems to capture 
system requirements. MSCs and a related 
mechanism called High-level Message 
Sequence Charts (HMSCs) have been 
standardized [1] for specifying 
telecommunication software. A version of 
MSCs called Sequence Diagrams are also a 
behavioral diagram type used in the UML 
standard [2]. These uses of MSCs are mainly 
in capturing the system requirements. 
However, if we move towards an 
implementation, an executable specification 
related in some fashion to the MSC-based 
requirements must be obtained. The main 
difficulty here is that the inter-object 
interactions described in forms of MSCs 
must be synthesized as executable 
specifications given in terms of intra-object 
behaviors as identified as [3]. This is a 
difficult problem and it has been studied in 
various limited contexts [3], [4], [5], [6]. A 
method of using MSCs to construct 
executable specifications in a more direct 
way is proposed in [7].  The main point of 
reference of their work is the formalism of 
Live Sequence Charts (LSC) [8] in which the 
component interactions are elaborated in a 
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27 
powerful way using the LSC language while 
the control flow information is completely 
suppressed.  
In this paper, we mainly contribute to 
the way of specifications of the protocols 
(based on MSCs) and to the way of 
translation of the specifications into a 
program of formal verification tool for 
formal verification. The remaining parts of 
this paper are organized in the following 
ways. In section 2, we present some related 
topics such as MSCs, Computation Tree 
Logic (CTL) that is used by SMV to specify 
the property of the protocol to be verified 
and SMV. In section 3, we present the syntax 
of the specification of the protocols. The 
translation process is discussed in section 4. 
In section 5, we present some verification 
results of the AMBA protocol that we have 
found through the SMV program generated 
by the translator. The conclusion and future 
works are included in section 6.  
 
2. Related Topics 
 
In this section, we describe some 
background knowledge related to our work. 
We narrate briefly MSCs, CTL and SMV. 
The definitions and notions discussed in this 
section will be used in the following 
sections.  
 
2.1 Message Sequence Chart (MSC) 
 
Message Sequence Charts (MSCs) are 
an attractive visual formalism that is often 
used in the early stage of system design to 
specify the system requirements. A main 
advantage of an MSC is its clear graphical 
layout which immediately gives an intuitive 
understanding of the described system 
behavior [9]. MSCs are particularly suited to 
describe the distributed telecommunication 
software [10], [11]. The wide ranges of use 
of MSCs are usually in the distributed 
systems and in a number of software 
methodologies [11], [12], [13]. In a 
distributed system, MSCs mainly 
concentrate on the exchange of messages 
among various processes and their 
environments as well as some internal 
actions in these processes. MSCs are also 
known as object interaction diagrams, timing 
sequence diagrams and message flow 
diagrams.   
In MSCs, the executing processes are 
shown by the vertical lines; these processes 
communicate through an explicit message 
passing (send-receive) among them shown 
by the horizontal or downward sloped arrow 
lines. The head of the arrow indicates the 
event message-receiving and the opposite 
end indicates the event message-sending. 
Each send-receive event (horizontal or 
downward sloped line) is labeled by the 
message identifier. For more clear 
understanding the MSC may also contain 
necessary data attributes as part of the 
message exchanged. A simple MSC is shown 
in the following Fig. 1 where there are two 
processes namely ‘CPU’ and ‘Memory’.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Time flows downward in each vertical 
line of MSCs.  So, in this MSC, the 
sequences of actions in process ‘CPU’ and 
‘Memory’ are {sending request, receiving 
+ve acknowledgement, sending address a 
and receiving value of address a} and 
{receiving request, sending +ve 
acknowledgement, receiving address a, an 
internal action v: = lookup(a) and sending 
value v} respectively. These orderings 
cannot be violated in either of the processes 
+ve acknowledgement 
e22 
e23 
v:=lookup(a) 
CPU Memory 
request 
address(a)
value(v) 
e20 
e21 
e10 
e11 
e12 
e13 
Fig. 1: A Message Sequence Chart 
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i.e. a total ordering of the events along every 
process is assumed. Every process of the 
MSC is assumed to contain a message queue 
to store the incoming messages and another 
message queue to store the outgoing 
messages. Each MSC is associated with a 
‘guard’. The MSC is executed when its 
guard is true. The guard is composed by 
predicates over the variables of the processes 
in the MSC connected by the logical 
connectives. The guard of the above MSC is 
CPU.status ∧ Memory.ready. The variable 
status is a boolean variable of the process 
CPU which is true when the CPU is ready to 
interact with Memory. Similarly, the variable 
ready is a boolean variable of the process 
Memory which is true when it can serve the 
request of the CPU. 
Let us discuss MSCs with its formal 
definition. Assume that P is the finite set of 
processes, M is the finite set of messages and 
A is the finite set of internal actions. For each 
p∈P, a set of events the process p takes part 
in is defined by ∑p = {<p!q, m> | p≠q, q∈ P, 
m∈ M}∪{<p?q, m> | p≠q, q∈ P, m∈ 
M}∪{<p, a> | a∈ A}.The meanings of 
<p!q,m>, <p?q,m> and <p,a> are ‘process p 
sends message m to process q’, ‘process p 
receives message m from process q’ and 
‘process p performs internal action a’ 
respectively. We set ∑ = ∪p∈P∑p and let α, β 
range over ∑. Assume a set of channel Ch = 
{(p,q) | p ≠ q}  and let c, d range over Ch. A 
∑-labeled poset is a structure S = (E, ≤, λ) 
where (E, ≤)  is a poset and λ: E→Σ is a 
labeling function. Here E is a finite set of 
events and ≤ is a partial order which is 
reflexive, transitive and anti-symmetric. For 
any event e ∈ E, ↓ e = {e1|e1≤e} where e1≤e 
means that the event e1 occurs before event 
e. For p∈P, and a ∈ ∑, let Ep = {e| λ(e) ∈ 
∑p} and Ea= {e|λ(e)∈a}. For channel c, let 
the relation Rc= {(e, e1)| λ(e) =p!q, 
λ(e1)=p?q and |↓e∩Ep!q|=|↓e1∩Ep?q|}. For a 
process p∈P, the relation is Rp=(Ep×Ep)∩≤. 
The Rch-edge across the processes is depicted 
by the horizontal or downward sloped edge.  
Thus, an MSC (over P) is a finite ∑-
labeled poset ),,( λ≤= ES  that satisfies the 
following conditions [14]: a) For every p∈ 
P, Rp is a linear order. b) For every {p, q}∈P  
and p≠q, |Ep! q| = |Eq?p| i.e. no lifeless 
communication edge exists in MSC that 
means the number of sent messages equals 
the number of received messages. c) ≤ = (Rp 
∪ RCh)* where Rp=∪p∈PRp  and RCh=∪c∈ChRc  
i.e. the partial order of MSC is its visual 
order; deduced by linear orders of 
participating processes and the sent-receive 
order of the messages. 
The agents(S) is the set of agents 
(processes) taking part in the MSC S=(E,≤,λ) 
defined as agents(S) = {p|Ep≠ ∅}.  
 
2.2 CTL  
 
SMV uses CTL to specify the properties 
to be verified. In this section, a brief 
description of CTL is stated. 
Atomic propositions, standard boolean 
connectives of propositional logic and 
temporal operators all together are used to 
build the CTL formulae. If AP is a finite set 
of atomic propositions then- a) p∈AP is a 
formula, b) if ϕ is a formula then ~ϕ is also a 
formula, c) if ϕ and ϕ1 are formulae then ϕ ∨ 
ϕ1 is also a formula, d) if ϕ is a formula then 
EX(ϕ), AX(ϕ), EF(ϕ), AF(ϕ), EG(ϕ) and 
AG(ϕ)  are also formulae, e) if ϕ and ϕ1 are 
formulae then EU(ϕ, ϕ1) and AU(ϕ, ϕ1) are 
also formulae. 
Each temporal operator is composed of 
two parts: a path quantifier (universal (A) or 
existential (E)) followed by a temporal 
modality (F, G, X, U). There are generally 
many execution paths (the sequences) of 
state transitions of the system starting at the 
current state. The path quantifier indicates 
whether the modality defines a property that 
should be true for all those possible paths 
(denoted by universal path quantifier A) or 
whether the property needs to hold only on 
one path or on some paths (denoted by 
existential path quantifier E). The temporal 
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modalities describe the ordering of events in 
time along an execution path and have the 
following meanings: a) Fϕ (read as “ϕ holds 
sometime in the future”) is true in a path if 
there exists a state in that path where formula 
ϕ is true, b) Gϕ (read as “ϕ holds globally”) 
is true in a path if ϕ is true at each and every 
state in that path, c) Xϕ (read as “ϕ holds in 
the next state”) is true in a path if ϕ is true in 
the state reached immediately after the 
current state in that path, d) ϕ U φ (read as 
“ϕ holds until φ holds”) is true in a path if φ 
is true in some state in that path, and ϕ holds 
in all preceding states. 
 
2.2.1  Specification of Properties in CTL 
 
In this section, some examples of 
common constructs of CTL formula to 
specify the specifications of the systems in 
verification are stated. These are the 
followings: a) AG (x→AFy): For all 
reachable states (AG), if x is asserted in the 
state, then always at some later point (AF), 
we must reach a state where y is asserted. b) 
AG(AFx): The proposition x holds infinitely 
often on every computational path. c) AG 
(x→A(xUy)): It is always the case that if x 
occurs in any state, then eventually y is true, 
and until that time, x must continue to be 
true. d) EF(x∧EXx))→EF(y∧EX EXz): If it 
is possible for x to be asserted in three 
consecutive states, then it is also possible to 
reach a state where y is asserted and from 
there after two more steps a state where z is 
asserted.  
   
2.3 Symbolic Model Verifier (SMV) 
 
Symbolic Model Verifier (SMV) [15] is 
a formal verification tool. It is used for 
checking finite state systems ranging from 
completely synchronous to completely 
asynchronous and from the detailed to the 
abstracts. In SMV, the Computation Tree 
Logic (CTL), one kind of temporal logics is 
used to state the specifications of the system 
to be verified. The CTL permits a rich class 
of temporal properties like safety, fairness, 
liveness etc. to be specified in a concise 
syntax. SMV verifies the stated 
specifications investing all the possible 
behaviors of the system i.e. this is in contrast 
to a simulator, which only verifies the 
behavior of the system for the provided 
vectors. 
A SMV specification consists of a 
collection of properties each of which may 
be as simple as a statement that a particular 
pair of signals are never asserted at the same 
time, or it might state some complex 
relationship in the values or timing of the 
signals. SMV allows concise specifications 
about temporal relationships between 
signals, and can automatically be verified. 
SMV uses the Binary Decision Diagram 
(BDD)-based symbolic model checking 
algorithm to effectively and efficiently find 
out if the system specifications are satisfied 
or not. If a specification is not satisfied by 
the model, SMV automatically produces a 
counterexample. For this, SMV is a very 
effective debugging tool as well as a formal 
verification system.  
 
3. Specifications of the Protocol 
 
The specifications is composed of a 
finite set of processes each of which is a 
system component and performs a list of 
transaction schemes where a transaction 
scheme is the unit of interactions among 
different processes and consists of a guarded 
choice between a set of transactions where a 
transaction is modeled as an MSC.  
The protocol is described by a textual 
input file and the target is to build the 
corresponding SMV program for it to be 
used for verification. The syntax for 
specifying the protocol and mapping of these 
specifications to the target SMV file are 
narrated below. Fig. 2 shows the syntax.  
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Fig.2: Syntax of the specifications 
S   → PROTOCOL protocol-name { proc-dec-part   trans-sch-dec-part } 
proc-dec-part  → proc-dec-part  proc-dec | proc-dec 
proc-dec   → PROCESS process-name {var-dec-part    equation-part   } 
type   → basic-type | enum-type | array-type 
basic-type  → range-type | BOOLEAN 
enum-type  → { id-list } 
id-list   → identifier (, identifier)+ 
array-type  → ARRAY range-type OF basic-type 
range-type  → interger-const .. interger-const 
var-dec-part  → var-dec-part var-dec; | ε 
var-dec   → type-id : id-list 
equation-part  → EQUATION id-list; 
trans-sch-dec-part  → trans-sch-dec trans-sch-dec-part | trans-sch-dec 
trans-sch-dec  → SCHEME trans-schm-name { trans-list } 
trans-list   → trans-dec trans-list | trans-dec 
trans-dec  → TRANSACTION trans-name { 
         AGENTS { agent-list } guard-section ; } 
        | TRANSACTION trans-name { AGENTS { agent-list }  
guard-section  → GUARD guard ; 
agent-list  → agent-list agent | agent 
agent   → process-name : event-list 
event-list  → event , event-list | event ; 
event   → send(mesg-id, var) | send(mesg-id, const, type) |  
                                               recv(process-name.mesg-id) | {action} 
action-atom  → simple-stmt ; | if-stmt 
action   → action action-atom | action-atom 
simple-stmt  → var := expr | var :=DIN 
expr   → expr [* | / | &] F | F 
F   → F + G | F - G | F | G 
G   → G mod H | H 
H   → H RelOp I | I 
I   → ~I | -I | (expr) | var | const 
const   → integer-const | boolean-const 
guard   → guard & guard-atom | guard-atom | (guard-atom) 
guard-atom  → ~prop | prop 
prop   → prop or prop-atom | prop-atom 
prop-atom  → scoped-var relop const | scoped-var relop scoped-var | scoped-var 
relop   → = | < | > | ≤ | ≥ | != 
if-stmt   → IF expr { action } | IF expr action-atom | IF expr {action}ELSE {action}     
var   → identifier | identifier[identifier] | identifier [integer-const] 
scoped-var  → process-name.var 
protocol-name  → identifier 
process-name  → identifier 
trans-name  → identifier 
mesg-id   → identifier 
 
Bus Protocols: MSC-Based Specifications and Translation 
into Program of Verification Tool for Formal Verification 
 
International Journal of The Computer, the Internet and Management Vol. 15.No.3 (September - December, 2007) pp 26-38 
 
 
31 
At this point, let us describe the input 
file with the following simple example 
shown in Fig. 3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The file starts with the keyword 
protocol followed by the name of the 
protocol (cpu_bus_mem in the example).  
The processes are the components of the 
protocol considered. The ‘cpu’, ‘bus’ and 
‘mem’ are the processes in the ‘cpu-bus-
mem’ example. The variables declaration 
part of each process contains the variables 
which are used to store the messages 
received from other processes and also the 
local variables to perform internal actions. 
The types supported are boolean, range, 
enumeration and arrays of these basic types. 
The ‘equation’ of a process describes the 
order in which it will take part in various 
transaction schemes and is declared in the 
input language using the equation construct. 
Thus we assume that in this restricted 
version of our work, the control flow within 
each process is cyclic.  
The Transaction Scheme part contains 
the description of each transaction scheme 
and is described using the scheme construct. 
Each scheme consists of one or more 
transactions where each of the transactions is 
modeled as a guarded MSC. The transaction 
protocol cpu_bus_mem { 
            process cpu {     //process declaration 
0..7 : addr_buf, data_buf;     //range type variable 
boolean: status; 
equation T1;     //transaction scheme 
} 
            process bus {     //process declaration 
……………….. //variables and transaction scheme declaration    
} 
            process mem{     //process declaration 
            …………….. //similar 
} 
scheme T1 {     //start of transaction scheme T1 
transaction transfer {     //one transaction ‘transfer’ 
agents {     // agents of this transaction (‘cpu’ and ‘bus’) 
     cpu : send(req,1,boolean),     // send event 
              recv(bus.ack),     //recv event 
      {status:=din;};     //internal action  
     bus : recv(cpu.req),  
              send(ack,0,boolean); 
    } 
guard  ~bus.ready  & cpu.status;     //guard for this transaction 
    }     //end of this transaction 
transaction not_transfer { 
         …………………. //similar 
} 
}     //end of transaction scheme T1 
scheme T2{     //start of transaction scheme T2 
           ………….. 
}     // end of transaction scheme T2 
}     //end of input file 
 
Fig. 3: An Example of the Specifications 
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executes only if its guard is true.  
In each transaction the participating 
processes are declared using the agents 
construct. The actions of each process in this 
transaction are also defined here. These 
actions can be sending or receiving of 
messages or internal actions as described 
below. 
• A send action consists of a message 
id (which should be unique both in 
sender and receiver), the value to be 
sent (can either be a boolean/integer 
constant or a variable of suitable 
type) and the data-type of value. The 
data-type is required in the send 
declaration in order to determine 
which port the data is being sent on. 
As for example, the integer value 1 
can represent a boolean value or a 
value of type range[n1..n2]. This 
allows us to enforce type matching 
on the sender and receiver ends i.e. 
if a process p sends a message x and 
a process q receives this message as 
y, it is expected that the data-types 
of x and y to be the same. 
• A receive declaration recv specifies 
message-id and the process from 
which the message is received. One 
special variable called din stores the 
value of the messages received. This 
is necessary for the local resolution 
of the conflicts in the processes. 
This variable is the key to get all the 
necessary values from other 
processes to the current process to 
decide on the resolution condition. 
The assumption here is that a 
process receives all the variable 
values through din to decide on a 
resolution condition. The variable 
din is struct type which has a field 
for each of the data-types used in the 
specification file. It also contains a 
field for storing the data-type of the 
last message received. A process can 
use the value of a received message 
by assigning din to a variable. Since 
there is only one din variable per 
process, it should be made sure to 
use the received value before it is 
over-written by another ‘receive’ 
message. 
• An internal action is specified by 
enclosing a set of sequential 
statements (like checking of a 
logical condition, assigning a value 
to a variable etc.) within parenthesis. 
Needless to say, an internal action 
should involve only the local 
variables of the process and the 
special variable din. 
The guard of each transaction consists of 
propositions of all the processes in that 
transaction. In a guard, it is not expected to 
compare the values of variables of different 
processes (variables within same process can 
be compared). It is expected that all the 
transactions within a transaction scheme can 
be distinguished for a particular process by 
the variable/variables of that process in the 
guards of the transactions.  
Now we want to show how we can 
represent the transaction within a transaction 
scheme of a bus protocol using MSCs. We 
have taken AMBA bus protocol as an 
example. In AMBA protocol, these are 
master component Pm, interface of the master 
Im, the bus controller BC, interface of the 
slave component Is and the slave component 
Ps. The master Pm sends data to the slave Ps. 
The master Pm enqueues data into the queue 
of the master interface Im which requests the 
bus controller BC for the bus access. Getting 
the access, if the slave interface Is is ready, 
Im sends the data to the slave interface which 
finally dequeues data to the slave Ps. The 
following Fig. 4 shows four transaction 
schemes where the scheme in figure (a), (b), 
(c) and (d) show the enqueuing of data, 
requesting for the bus access and the normal 
data transfer and dequeuing scenarios. The 
formula stated at the bottom of each MSC is 
the guard for that MSC.  
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The transaction scheme Enqueue (Fig. 
4(a)) shows the enqueuing data from the 
master Pm into the queue of the master 
interface Im. This scheme happens when the 
status of the master Pm is true. When the 
master interface component is ready to 
accept data from the master then a successful 
enqueuing i.e. the left transaction (MSC) 
occurs and an internal action shown by the 
small box on the life line of Pm happens; 
otherwise the right transaction (enqueuing 
unsuccessful) occurs. The scheme Request  
(Fig. 4(b)) involves Im and BC. A request 
made for the access of the bus by the master 
interface to the bus controller BC. When the 
variable status of the master interface Im is 
true then Im requests the bus for the bus 
access. If BC.grant is true i.e. if the bus 
controller can grant the access to the master 
interface then Im sets true to status (left 
MSC) else false is set to status (right MSC).  
Let us now describe scheme Transfer (Fig. 
4(c)). In this scheme, the participating 
processes are Im, Is and BC. Before 
describing the transactions in this scheme, let 
us present some local variables of these 
processes. The variable data_sent holds 
when the data is sent. The maxwait is the 
variable that is fixed and indicates after how 
many wait cycles the bus access to the 
master will be suspended. The variable 
waitcnt holds the number of wait cycles 
encountered. The variables a_rcvd and 
d_rcvd hold the address and data 
respectively received from Im.   When the 
variable  status of  Im holds  (it has bus 
access) and the variable status of Is holds 
(Is.status holds when Is can accept 
data/address from Im i.e. its queue is not full) 
and waitcnt is 0, then the normal data 
transmission occurs. Here the life line of BC 
is not shown as there is only internal action 
of it and that is simply a no-op. In contrast to 
the scheme Enqueue the scheme Dequeue 
(Fig. 4(d)) denotes the dequeuing of data 
from the queue of the slave interface Is by 
the slave Ps. When the variable status of the 
slave is true then it can get or cannot get the 
data and address from the slave interface 
depending on the value of the variable ready 
in Is..   
Now let us see how we can map the 
specifications with the target SMV program. 
One module for each of the processes in the 
protocol is created in the SMV file. The 
variables declared for a process in the input 
file are also in the corresponding module of 
that process in the SMV file. It is assumed 
that there are two queues for every ordered 
pair of processes which interact between 
themselves (p sends messages to q and also 
receives messages from q, so there are two 
 
 
Fig. 4: Specification of some AMBA features using MSCs 
      req  Im 
Pm.status & 
Im.ready 
    Pm 
   sent:=1 
data 
  -ve ack 
      req  Im 
Pm.status & 
~Im.ready 
   Pm 
 
(b) Request 
      req 
+ve ack 
 BC 
Im.status &  
BC.grant 
   Im 
   status:=1 
Im.status &  
~BC.grant 
      req
-ve ack
 BC    Im 
      
status:=0
Im.status & Is.status &
Is.waitcnt=0  
addr(a) 
status(1) 
   Im 
data(d)  a_rcvd:=a 
d_rcvd:=d
    data_sent:=1 
Is 
 
(c) Normal data transfer 
Ps.status & 
~Is.ready 
+ve 
     addr 
     data 
   Is 
Ps.status &  
Is.ready 
   Ps 
    recvd:=1 
-ve ack 
   Is   Ps     req 
 
(d) Dequeue 
req 
+ve ack 
(a) Enqueue 
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queues for them). The sender enqueues 
messages and the receiver dequeues 
messages. A queue size (Q_SIZE) is defined 
and fixed for all processes. For the module of 
the process p, some boolean variables such 
as full_p_q, empty_q_p and some range type 
variable namely tail_p_q, head_q_p are 
declared where p≠q and q∈{set of all 
processes in the protocol}. The range of 
these range type variables is from 0 to 
Q_SIZE-1. The initial values of the variables 
head_q_p and tail_p_q are set to zero. Every 
time when a message is received by process 
p from q, the next value of the variable 
head_q_p is set to (head_q_p+1) mod 
Q_SIZE and when a message is sent by p to 
q then the next value of variable tail_p_q is 
set to (tail_p_q+1) mod Q_SIZE. The 
variable full_p_q holds (((tail_p_q+1) mod 
Q_SIZE = head_p_q)) when the queue (for 
sending message) between p to q is full and 
hence no message can be sent further from p 
to q before the process q receives the 
message from p. Similarly, when empty_q_p 
holds ( head_q_p = tail_q_p ) then the 
process p has nothing from q to receive. A 
scalar type variable state (state: = {_p0, _p1, 
_p2, ………, _pn})  is declared for each 
process p which contains all the states that 
the process p can be in. The value of n is 
calculated from the total number of different 
events the process p takes part in.   
 
4. Translator 
 
In the previous section, we discuss the 
syntax of the specifications with example 
and the mapping of the specification to the 
target SMV file. Now it is the time to look at 
the translation process of the specifications 
into SMV program. The first step is the 
standard lexical analysis. This is followed by 
a parsing step checking syntax. After the 
confirmation from the parser that the input 
file is grammatically right, the translation to 
the target code (SMV) starts. We briefly 
describe the lexical analyzer, syntactic 
analyzer (parser) and generation of SMV 
code in this section. 
 
4.1 Lexical Analysis 
 
JFlex is the lexical analysis tool used in 
the translator. In addition to the lexical 
analysis, JFlex called by the parser (in this 
case the parser is Constructor of Useful 
Parser (CUP) which is paired with JFlex) 
does tasks such as i) the identification code 
with the token type of the recognized token 
is passed to parser, ii) the value of the integer 
literal and other information is passed to 
parser and iii) does the programmer coded 
actions after recognition of the token. The 
first of these three tasks is used for syntactic 
analysis discussed in the next section and the 
other two tasks help the parser to generate 
the target code. 
The valid lexical tokens of the 
specifications are written in the file 
‘lexer.flex’ from which a java version 
(‘MyScanner.java’) of the lexical analyzer 
(also known as scanner) is created by the 
command ‘jflex lexer.flex’.  This 
‘MyScanner.java’ is the scanner or the 
lexical analyzer for the specification file. 
The ‘lexer.flex’ file is composed of 
three parts such as i) user code, ii) options 
and declarations and iii) lexical rules each 
divided by the sign %%. Let us see the first 
section ‘user code’. In this section, the 
package and import statements are written 
that should be exactly at the top of the 
generated scanner class (‘MyScanner’) i.e. 
the text up to the first line starting with %% 
(starting of the second section) is copied 
verbatim to the top of the scanner class. In 
our case, this section contains i) import 
java_cup.runtime.*; ii) import JFlex.*; and 
iii) import java.util.*; The second section 
‘options and declarations’ is more 
interesting. It consists of a set of options, 
code that is included inside the generated 
scanner class (‘MyScanner’), macro 
declarations and lexical states. The last 
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section ‘lexical rules’ contains the regular 
expressions and actions that are to be 
executed in the case when the scanner 
matches the associated regular expression.   
 
4.2 Syntactic Analysis 
 
The syntactic analyzer checks if the file 
is organized according to the grammar once 
the lexical analyzer assures that all the 
tokens are valid in the source file. For 
example, the lexical analyzer may pass the 
five valid tokens such as guard { transaction 
agents } to the parser. But the parser sees it 
as invalid organization.  
As stated earlier, CUP is used as the 
parser for the translation. The CUP with its 
usual task, does one additional job and that is 
it can perform any code the programmer 
wants to encode upon recognizing a valid 
grammatical construct. This helps generating 
target code in two ways i) the generated code 
is written to a file to be executed later and ii) 
the generated code is executed during 
parsing. 
The syntactic structure of the 
specification file is written in the file 
‘grammar.cup’ from which some files are 
produced by the command java 
java_cup.Main < grammar.cup. On of these 
files is parser.java and it is the syntactic 
analyzer (parser) for our specification file. 
There are five sections in a specification 
such as i) package and import specifications, 
ii) user code, iii) terminal and non-terminal 
lists, iv) precedence and associativity of 
terminals and  v) grammar. Each of these 
parts must appear in order. We have not 
discussed these sections here.  
 
4.3 Generating SMV Code 
 
After the scanning and parsing, the final 
task for the translation process is to create 
the target code i.e. SMV code. The language 
used for this task is Java. 
Let us look at the Main class of the 
implementation. Before starting the class 
Main, the class java.io.* is imported. The 
Main class is then declared. In this class, the 
method main is declared where the parser is 
called to analyze the specifications (input 
file) syntactically. The parser then calls the 
scanner that analyzes the input lexically, at 
the time the parser requires the next lexical 
token of the input file. This is done in the try 
block shown below: 
  
try{ parser p = new parser(new 
MyScanner(new FileReader(argv[0])));  
p.parse();} 
 
The try block means that if something 
fails then the program exits that block. The 
first line of the try block creates a new parser 
object and the second line starts the parser. 
In the main method there is a catch 
block after the try block. This catch block 
takes the exception, the reason why try block 
fails and to clean up errors occurred before 
the program quits. This is the completion of 
the Main class.  
Several classes are designed and 
implemented to generate the SMV code. 
Among them the following are some 
important classes. 
i)    Protocol.java: An object of this 
class represents the protocol. 
ii) Scheme.java: An object of this class 
represents a transaction scheme of 
the specifications.   
iii) Process.java: An object of this class 
represents a process of the protocol. 
It holds all the local variables and 
equation of this process and the 
methods that are called by the 
Protocol.java to generate the SMV 
code for this process. 
iv) Transaction.java:  An object of this 
class represents a transaction in a 
transaction scheme. 
v)  Node.java: An object of this class 
represents the node in the tree where 
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a tree is a different representation of 
the events of a process that gives the 
sequence in which the SMV code 
for a process has to be generated. 
 
Now let us look at the way of creating 
the SMV code for a process briefly. A 
separate event sequence is generated for each 
process for each scheme, and these event- 
sequence are then concatenated together 
according to the equation of each process. 
Suppose the event sequence for the process 
P for the scheme S is to be generated. Let the 
transactions of S in which P is an agent be 
Tp1 ,Tp2 , . . .Tpn . For generating the event 
sequence, each transaction is projected 
(accumulating all its actions and guards) 
onto P. Thus a list of propositions Gp1 ,Gp2 
, . . .Gpn (the guard of this process is simply 
the conjunction of these propositions) and a 
list of event Ep1 ,Ep2 , . . .Epn  are achieved.  
Now the leading (first event in the list) 
event of each transaction (projected on P) is 
examined and the transactions with same 
event are grouped into one list. If there is 
more than one group i.e. there exist at least 
two transactions which differ in the leading 
event then it is understood that the 
transactions are not isomorphic. Hence these 
groups are labeled as ‘positive’ and 
‘negative’ based on the leading atomic 
proposition of their guards. For instance, 
suppose the groups {Tp1 ,Tp3}, {Tp4} and 
{Tp2 ,Tp5} are made by comparing the 
leading event. Suppose the leading atomic 
proposition is p (or ~p). Then each 
transaction in a particular group should have 
the exactly same sign of the proposition. 
Furthermore, different groups with the same 
sign of p are merged together and the whole 
process is repeated i.e. if the leading 
proposition were {p.v1, ~p.v1, p.v1, p.v1,~ 
p.v1} in the above example, then the new 
groups will be {Tp1, Tp3, Tp4} and {Tp2, 
Tp5}. In the generated code, value of 
variable v1 will be checked at this place to 
determine whether the next event should be 
as dictated by {Tp1, Tp3, Tp4} or {Tp2, 
Tp5}.  
If all the transactions initially have the 
same leading event, then their second events 
are examined in order to form groups and so 
on. Thus the algorithm consists of two 
distinct steps. 
 
• Identify the point where event 
sequences of transactions begin to 
differ.  
• Identify the proposition based on 
which the process will make a local 
decision as to which transaction is to 
be followed. We may need to look at 
more than one proposition to 
uniquely identify the transaction.  
 
The states in translated code correspond 
to each action of a process. As an 
optimization, a sequence of actions for which 
no guards have to be evaluated in between, 
can be collapsed into one state. 
In the translated SMV code, message 
passing is handled using bounded length 
queues (whose length can be given as a 
parameter during translation phase). The 
blocking semantics is followed in case of full 
or empty queues. 
 
5. Verification Result 
 
In this section, we present some 
verification results of the AMBA bus 
protocol (described in section 3) using SMV 
program generated by the translator. Each 
specification is followed by the meaning of 
the specification which is followed by the 
SMV result.  
 
Specification 1: EF BC.grant 
Meaning:  This specification states that there 
exists a computation path where in some 
future state BC.grant holds. This 
specification checks if the bus controller can 
grant the bus access to the master in some 
future time in at least one execution. 
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SMV Result:This specification is true.  
 
Specification 2: EF Is.status 
Meaning:  This specification states that there 
exists a path where in some future state 
Is.status holds. This specification checks if 
the slave interface Is is capable of receiving 
data and address from the master interface Im 
in some future time.  
SMV Result: SMV shows that this 
specification is true. 
 
Specification 3: AG (Pm.sent ? AF 
(Ps.recvd)) 
Meaning: This specification states that in 
every reachable state if the master Pm sends 
data then eventually the data will be received 
by the slave Ps.  
SMV Result: SMV shows that this 
specification is true. 
 
6. Conclusion and Future Works 
 
We have presented our work on a high 
level executable specification mechanism for 
specification of bus protocols that combines 
distributed control flow features with 
interactions refined as Message Sequence 
Charts (MSCs). In this chapter, we highlight 
the summary of our work and point some 
future research directions. 
 
6.1 Summary of Our Work 
 
 We have contributed to the following 
main tasks: 
 
• The way of specification of the   
protocol using MSCs. 
• Construction of a translator that 
translates the specifications into 
SMV programs.   The SMV is the 
well known model checking tool 
based on CTL. These SMV 
programs then formally verify the 
properties of the protocol.   
6.2 Future Work 
 
We see many further possibilities to 
continue this work. Some of the important 
works that may be investigated in future are 
the following: 
• The current restriction on the guards 
of the transactions within a 
transaction scheme can be removed 
for more flexible way of specifying 
the specifications.  
• The states for a process in translated 
code of SMV program correspond to 
each action of that process. As an 
optimization, a sequence of actions 
for which no guards have to be 
evaluated in between, can be made 
into one state. 
• Another interesting issue to pursue 
is to translate the protocol into 
another powerful model checking 
tool SPIN. The specifications can 
also be translated into Hardware 
Description Language (HDL) like 
verilog or VHDL. 
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